Applying the strategic-relational approach to urban political ecology: The water management problems of the baixada fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil by Ioris, A.A.R.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applying the strategic-relational approach to urban political
ecology: The water management problems of the baixada
fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Citation for published version:
Ioris, AAR 2012, 'Applying the strategic-relational approach to urban political ecology: The water
management problems of the baixada fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil' Antipode, vol 44, no. 1, pp. 122-
150. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00848.x
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00848.x
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Antipode
Publisher Rights Statement:
Published version is available online at www.interscience.wiley.com copyright of Wiley-Blackwell (2012)
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
Applying the Strategic-Relational Approach to 
Urban Political Ecology: The Water Management 
Problems of the Baixada Fluminense, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil  
 
Antonio A. R. Ioris 
Address for correspondence: 
 
School of Geosciences, 
The University of Edinburgh, 
Drummond Street 
Edinburgh EH8 9XP 
 
 
This is the author’s final draft as submitted for publication. The final version was 
published in Antipode by Wiley-Blackwell Publishers (2012) 
 
Cite As: Ioris, AAR 2012, 'Applying the strategic-relational approach to urban political 
ecology: The water management problems of the baixada fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil' Antipode, vol 44, no. 1, pp. 122-150. 
 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00848.x 
 
Made available online through Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 1 
Applying the Strategic-Relational Approach to Urban Political Ecology:   
The Water Management Problems of the Baixada Fluminense,  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
 
Abstract: The complexity of water management requires an explanatory framework that 
is able to capture the multidimensionality of the relations between nature and society 
increasingly mediated by the state. The evolution of water problems in the Baixada 
Fluminense, a wetland area situated to the north of Rio de Janeiro, provides a 
paradigmatic example of how water management becomes incorporated into the fluid 
politics between state, nature and society. The local experience is examined by making 
use of the strategic-relational approach (after Bob Jessop) expanded to urban political 
ecology. The concept of ‘trialectics’ is proposed as an ontological representation of the 
interconnections between the state apparatus, class-based relations and the socionatural 
elements of the water cycle. The empirical results show that, in a situation of precarious 
water supply, regular flooding and severe river degradation, state interventions have 
tended to favour certain groups and areas, which only intensifies the politicisation of 
water management.  
 
Keywords: Water management, water governance, political ecology, environmental 
justice, strategic-relational approach, dialectics, trialectics, Baixada Fluminense, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. 
 
The Political Ecology of Water Management 
 
The mobilisation of resources and people for the exploitation, control and 
conservation of water is one of the most strategic responsibilities of the national state. 
Water management policies are as old as history, as demonstrated by the achievements of 
ancient civilisations, such as in China, Egypt and Mesopotamia, which already adopted 
sophisticated practices of river engineering, channel construction and agriculture 
irrigation (Haslam 1991). With the consolidation of the capitalist state, the public 
management of water reserves – either as a genuine governmental priority or reflecting 
demands exerted by pressure groups on the state apparatus – assumed an even more 
prominent role in terms of economic development and urban expansion. The management 
of water involves some fundamental questions that are particularly relevant for the 
conceptualisation of the relationship between humans and an increasingly technologised 
urban landscape (Gandy 2004). In effect, contemporary water management constitutes a 
powerful mechanism in the social production of the urban space, given that, as observed 
by Lefebvre (1991), the capitalist hegemony, ruled over by the state, makes use of the 
space on the basis of an underlying logic of capital accumulation and with the help of 
knowledge and technical expertise. Nonetheless, the complex expressions of urban water 
problems (e.g. overuse of water, river pollution, precarious water services, etc.), while 
strongly determined by capitalist relations, are not reducible to them. Despite the exercise 
of capitalist hegemony through the state apparatus, water management remains also 
deeply embedded in a permanent interchange between the collective and the individual, 
the local and the macro, the horizontal and the vertical lines of interaction. Through this 
interplay between particularities and generalities, the social relations around water 
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incarnate some of the most expressive values, expectations, accomplishments and 
frustrations of the capitalist form of society. 
Due to its very nature, water management is rarely consensual or politically 
neutral, but entails different levels of politicisation according to ecological, historico-
geographical and socioeconomic circumstances. Especially in situations of acute scarcity, 
the political networks that control water are further galvanised through contested 
relations to land and water (Giglioli and Swyngedouw 2008). The territorialized disputes 
around water, negotiated or magnified by the action of the state, situate water 
management in the centre of the rising debate on political ecology. That means a 
consideration of the balance of power behind processes of socio-environmental change, 
as well as the political unevenness that determines inequalities in the access and 
distribution of natural resources. Political ecology is in a privileged position to advance 
the study of the contested relationships between society and nature, likewise it can offer a 
common arena for intellectuals and militants to come together (Lipietz 2000). The 
political ecology of the urban is particularly concerned with the study of the metabolic 
processes (Keil 2005) that combine the human and the non-human domains in the 
ultimate production of (urban) socionature (Swyngedouw 2004). By linking the 
urbanisation of nature with everyday life and the politics of scale, urban political ecology 
offers a coherent approach for the examination of the interconnections between 
economic, political, social and ecological processes that together produce highly unjust 
and oppressive landscapes (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003). At the same time, urban 
political ecology is, and should be, responsive to the cultural and subjective dimensions 
of urban environmental struggles (Grove 2009). 
The evolution of urban water management in the Baixada Fluminense, a flat 
wetland area under tidal influence situated in the western side of the Guanabara Bay and 
to the north of the city of Rio de Janeiro, typifies the intricacy of the relations between 
state, nature and people, as well as the struggles for social opportunities and political 
influence. Because of its strategic location – close to the former capital of Brazil – the 
urbanisation of the Baixada historically attracted large contingents of slave descendents 
and also migrants from other parts of the country. With high rates of urbanisation in the 
second half of the 20th century, the lifelong problems of flooding and insalubriousness 
became deeply coupled with its antipode of human made water scarcity (i.e. lack of 
reliable potable water). It will be shown below that the complex and multifaceted water 
problems of the Baixada are intensely tied with the disordered expansion of the Rio de 
Janeiro metropolis and the insufficiencies of state action. The redemocratisation of the 
country began in 1979 (when the military issued the amnesty law and gradually reduced 
political repression) and, since then, a series of interventions and investment programmes 
have been directed to water management issues in the Baixada, which mobilised large 
sums of capital and created great expectations among the residents. However, those 
interventions have been largely frustrated by a combination of bad administration, 
demagogic appropriation of public policies and the containment of political contestation. 
Although some areas have benefited from the public programmes, the prevailing trend is 
one of discrimination and uneven development (both within the Baixada and, more 
importantly, in relation to the neighbouring areas). More recent projects and policies 
betray the inconsistencies of the contemporary agenda of institutional reforms (i.e. the 
‘governance agenda’), primarily because it has left innovative thinking and public 
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participation on the hands of the same agencies that in the past promoted, and continue to 
promote, highly centralised and disjointed approaches. Furthermore, the water 
management dilemmas of the Baixada have became vividly entrapped in political 
disputes about metropolitan development, such as the construction of new petrochemical 
complex (which is associated with a new metropolitan ring road and the urbanisation of 
the last remnants of the original Atlantic vegetation) and the construction of the infra-
structure for the 2016 Olympic Games.  
The purpose of this essay is to discuss the connections between the historico-
geographical causes of water problems and the persistence of controversies under the new 
institutional arrangements. The water management issues of the Baixada Fluminense will 
serve as a case study that exemplifies processes that are common to other Brazilian and 
Latin American conurbations. We believe to be helping to expand some poststructuralist 
and materialist analytical positions, as invited by Ekers and Loftus (2008), by specifying 
ways in which power is enacted and assessing the possibilities of political struggles 
around the use and conservation of water. The main contribution of this study is an 
attempt to link the emerging field of urban political ecology with the framework 
developed by Bob Jessop (2008), the so-called, “strategic-relational approach”. The text 
is organised as follows: the next section offers a tentative articulation, in the historical 
materialist tradition, of the ‘trialectical’ interconnections between state, society and 
nature (in this case, the water systems). The next section deals with the experience of the 
Baixada Fluminense, where it is examined the process of regional development and the 
evolution of political ecology problems, the series of large-scale remediation projects and 
the continuity of problems under supposedly new institutional arrangements. The final 
part of the text contains some conclusive remarks and points for further discussion.   
 
State, Society and Nature: The Trialectics of Water Management Problems 
 
Before we can examine the concrete experience of the Baixada Fluminense, it is 
first necessary to revisit the ontology of water management problems and situate it firmly 
within the sphere of political ecology and, ultimately, environmental justice. The inherent 
complexity of managed water systems requires an explanatory framework that 
comprehensively captures the multidimensionality of the relations between nature and 
society, which are increasingly mediated by the state. Water is not just a landscape 
resource with biophysical properties, but it is in effect a natural element that is used and 
transformed by different social groups according to demands and techniques, which 
epitomise specific historico-geographical circumstances. Water issues are embedded in 
particular cultural traditions, hydrological conditions and socioeconomic arrangements 
that incorporate institutional changes, interpersonal relations and technological 
improvements. As emphasised by Swyngedouw (2004), water is a hybrid whose flow 
describes processes that are simultaneously material, discursive and symbolic. However, 
the politico-economic intricacy of water management issues has been continuously 
neglected by policy makers and mainstream scholars alike. To a large extent, the 
oversimplification of water management problems primarily derives from an 
undertheorisation of the politicised role of the state and its involvement in class struggles 
(or what Jessop (2000:325) defines as ‘struggles with class-relevance’). Kalyvas 
(2002:105) observes that in recent years the state seems to have “retreated from the realm 
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of social sciences”, whilst there is a growing emphasis on globalisation and on 
postmodernist discourses (which both deal with the connections between global and local 
scales) that tends to overlook the significance of the national state. 
It is also the case that most of the water management approaches advanced by the 
nation state nowadays emanate from international and multilateral agencies (e.g. World 
Bank, UNESCO, World Water Council). Those mainstream positions have advocated 
calls for integration and public participation, which are summarised under the expression 
of ‘environmental governance’. The agenda of governance insists on a transition to more 
flexible procedures that go beyond traditional initiatives and include the action of both 
the state and a multitude of organisations and movements that constitute the non-state 
(Conca 2006). Instead of the conventional exercise of authority, better governance is 
expected to create lasting and positive changes according to goals such as openness 
accountability, effectiveness and participation (Batterbury and Fernando 2006). However, 
behind repeated references to participative governance, water management remains 
controlled by centralised government agencies and subject to the influence of powerful 
sectoral interests (Blomquist and Schlager 2005), with the material and discursive 
priorities of neoliberal policies being left above broader social and environmental 
considerations (Roberts 2008). Despite the apparent changes, today’s approaches have 
largely replicated the technocratic and centralised basis of water management that 
characterised infra-structure projects and development programmes of the welfare state 
period, only making use now of a new discourse grounded on the economic (monetary) 
value of water and instrumentalised forms of public participation (Garin and Richard-
Ferroudji 2008). For example, the growing focus on the economic value of water – as 
initially proclaimed in the 1992 Dublin Conference on Water and the Environment – has 
led to an increasing commodification of water resources (also called water marketisation 
cf. Conca 2006).    
In many countries, such as in Brazil, contemporary water legislation has 
nominally recognised the importance of universalising water services and public 
participation, but has also secured long-established advantages, increased the circulation 
of capital around water and environmental restoration, and paved the road for the 
formation of public-private partnerships (Ioris 2007). Ultimately, the documents and 
projects based on environmental governance have become little more than an adjunct of 
the neoliberalisation of public policies (Gandy 2006). Recent institutional reforms – 
which spread through laws, guidance and government programmes – have essentially 
failed to confront the sources of social injustice that underpin environmental degradation 
and deficient water services. The agenda of governance pays limited attention to the fact 
that the water problems are not “merely a question of management and technology, but 
rather, and perhaps in the first instance, a question of social power” (Swyngedouw 
2004:174), something that is not secret or detached from the tangible socionatural reality, 
but challenged and consolidated by everyday struggles fought over the material and 
symbolic elements of the lived environments (Loftus and Lumsden 2008). The result are 
successive failures in the recent history of public water management, which unfolds in a 
succession from one vantage point to another, in a “parallax movement” (a notion 
suggested by Žižek 2006:26) that never reaches a definitive solution, nor reconcile, in a 
satisfactory manner, social and natural demands. 
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At the same time, it should be pointed out that a number of political ecology 
scholars have concentrated their studies on popular mobilisation, moral economy and the 
‘second-contradiction’ of capitalism (Mann 2009), but not yet dedicated enough attention 
to the evolution and the scalar linkages of water management problems promoted by (or 
in relation to) the state. Instead of being one among other political ecology players (as 
conceptualised, in an otherwise interesting book, by Bryant and Bailey 1997), the state is 
in effect the embodiment of political hegemonies and the immanence of social relations 
inscribed in the management of water. If the resolution of water management problems 
depends both on how citizens perceive their claims and also on how they are able to 
collectively negotiate their demands through identity, economic activity and spatial 
location (Anand 2007), the state remains the central protagonist of the assessment of 
(socionatural) water systems and coordination of responses. Consequently, in many 
cases, political ecology remains a field of interesting scholarly work, but with a 
conceptualisation of state action that is normally superficial or taken for granted. That 
creates an analytical gap, especially considering that the state is nowadays increasingly 
called to exercise a strong procedural power to govern not just property, rights and 
knowledge, but bureaucrats ultimately have to administer “the sky, the climate, the sea, 
viruses, or wild animals” (Latour 2004:204). Moreover, instead of simply the apparatus 
of the government, the structure of the state is effectively a continuation of civil society 
that, because of its political commitments, performs the ambivalent role as agent of both 
reform and stability. Whilst containing the demands of the broad society through a 
combination of coercion and consent, the action of the state primarily reflects “back its 
prestige upon the class upon which it is based” (Gramsci 1971:269). The capitalist state 
constitutes, thus, the main power instrument of the dominant groups, which nonetheless 
operates in a continuous process of formation and superseding of an unstable social 
equilibrium.1 It is important to recognise that the control over nature is actually one of the 
decisive channels for the delivery of political power in the attempt to contain that 
unstable social equilibrium. 
Against both the assumption that the state is a neutral organisation promoting the 
common good (as implicit in the theory of environmental governance) and the limited 
discussion of the class-based tendencies of state action (as still implicit in the work of 
many critical scholars), Jessop (2007) has argued that state power combines centralised 
and diffuse authority in conformity with the fundamental features of political economy 
and profoundly embedded in social relations. The state is an institutional ensemble of 
power centres that does not exist in isolation of the balance of political forces, but these 
forces are in effect responsible for shaping – at least in part – the structure and 
intervention of the state (Jessop 1982:221).2 Yet there is never a full correspondence 
between the capitalist state and the interests of the dominant classes, but the cooptation, 
                                                 
1 In a society with antagonistic class relations the political equilibrium is always transitory and the action of 
the state reflects the political hegemony achieved under concrete spatio-time conditions (Gramsci 1971). 
Note that the Gramscian notion of hegemony is a ‘never finished project’ that involves material and 
symbolic processes behind ‘emerging realities’ (Asher and Ojeda 2009).  
2 In terms of water services, the state can act as a direct supplier or it can delegate to private operators and 
act primarily as a technical regulator. The former types of intervention are more closely related to the 
‘authoritarian state’ (cf. Kalyvas 2002 and based on Nicos Poulantzas) that dominated the period after the 
Second World War, while the focus on regulation is characteristic of the current phase, the ‘liberal 
authoritarian legalism’. 
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pressure and colonisation of the public administration by the hegemonic groups – who 
Miliband (1969:53) calls “men belonging to the world of business, and particularly of big 
business” – are not absolute. It means that to a certain extent the capitalist state remains 
politically separated from the circuits of capital and accumulation (Offe 1996) and, 
therefore, needs to be understood as a dynamic institution that offers unequal 
opportunities to different social groups to achieve their specific political purposes. This 
selectivity of the state is not given in advance, but it is the result of the interplay between 
state priorities and socio-political contestation within and beyond state institutions 
(Jessop 1990). For those reasons, the political construction of state authority requires 
analytical tools – such as the ‘strategic relational approach’ (SRA) proposed by Bob 
Jessop – that should be capable of exploring the inscribed asymmetries of state action, as 
well as the social forces that enjoy different capacities to pursue strategies that are more 
or less adapted to its selective functioning. The SRA constitutes a neo-Gramscian 
perspective to state power (as a social relation not entirely reducible to class domination) 
that considers the state as an institutional terrain of contestation. Following such strategic 
and relational standpoint, the state is not seen as a monolithic, separate entity but evolves 
according to a permanent interdependence with the complexities of society (Jessop 2008). 
The SRA framework certainly represents an improvement in the understanding of 
the state as a factor of cohesion and as a locus of dispute, and relative autonomy, within 
the circuits of capital accumulation and class struggle. However, as Jessop (2008) is the 
first to admit, the study of the state also requires a more systematic treatment of spatial 
dynamics, as well as of the relations between nature and society. As observed by 
Swyngedouw and Heynen (2003:912-913), “…socioecological processes give rise to 
scalar forms of organisation – such as states, local governments, interstate arrangements 
and the like – and a nested set of related and interacting socioecological spatial scales. 
(…) These territorial and networked spatial scales are never set, but are perpetually 
disputed, redefined, reconstituted and restructured in terms of their extent, content, 
relative importance and interrelations”. The need to embrace the socioecological and 
sociospatial properties of the state is even more justified under the current pressures of 
neoliberalism, because since the accumulation crisis of the capitalist system in the 1970s 
the national state has been under intense pressure from the twin forces of globalisation 
and localisation (Neumann 2009). As a step in that direction, the spatialisation of the 
SRA framework attempts to link the general form of the capitalist state and the 
contingent historico-geographical experiences in the course of capitalist development 
(Brenner 2004, Brenner et al. 2003). Likewise, Jessop et al. (2008) have integrated the 
four key dimensions of sociospatial relations employed by social scientists in the last 
three decades (i.e. territory, place, scale and networks) and positioned them in relation to 
the SRA proposal. These authors claim that through the incorporation of a ‘polymorphy’ 
of conceptual orientations it should be possible to convey an instigative tool that extends 
through interconnected scales and integrates the multiplicity of fields of operation.  
Nonetheless, this particular solution advanced by Jessop et al. (2008) seems yet to 
fall into a rather too prescriptive categorisation, given that it is built around undesirable 
binarisms (i.e. the examples given are the linkages between place and territory, scale and 
territory, and network and territory). According to the last authors, those ‘duets’ could 
become the entry points into the assessment of complex, multidimensional systems. 
However, such formulation has also the negative consequence of limiting the analysis of 
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sociospatial relations to a sort of checklist of paired associations, instead of embracing 
the full extent of interscalar and multisector state interventions. The conclusion is that, if 
the spatialised version of the SRA represents an important contribution towards 
recognising the geographical complexities of the state, it is still necessary to incorporate 
the political ecological dimension as a more integral component of the evolving relations 
between the state and society. Rather than too schematic constructions, our starting point 
for a unifying investigation of political ecology is the comprehension that water 
management extends through the interconnections between state intervention, social 
interactions and socionatural hydrological systems. Whilst rejecting any claims of 
geographical determinism or ecological fetishism, we submit that the biophysical 
characteristics of managed water systems are not only shaped, but directly influence 
social relations and political disputes (within and beyond the state). Examples of the vital 
links between water, state and society are the circumstances of water scarcity and 
environmental degradation caused by state action, which in turn produce social distress 
and provoke further interventions by the state. These are particular socio-physical 
phenomena through which symbolic formations are forged, social groups enrolled, 
natural processes and things entangled, and political power relations expressed and 
reconstituted (Swyngedouw 2007).  
In view of that, it is neither necessary to invoke overcomplicated neologisms, nor 
proceed to an excessive ontologisation (as warned by Jessop et al. 2008) to incorporate 
the politicised relations between state, society and nature. All that is needed is to revisit 
the foundations of dialectical thinking, which is one of the most powerful, but least 
understood (Castree 1996), concepts of the Hegelian-Marxist tradition (which, 
incidentally, constitutes the main source of inspiration for political ecology). Dialectics 
dedicates special attention to the understanding of processes, flows, relations and 
contradictions over the analysis of elements, structures and things (Harvey 1996; see also 
Gidwani 2008), which is precisely the analytical device required to examine the 
historico-geographic evolution of water management issues. Castree (1996) observes that 
Harvey perceived dialectics as central for the productive tension between analysis and 
epistemological reflexivity, which means that a dialectical model of thinking serves as 
both a mode of explanation and a mode of capturing the contradictions of capitalism. In 
our case, it can be argued that the dilemmas of contemporary water policies originate in a 
dialectical tension between the capitalist and the socioecological rationality of the state 
apparatus at the service of the hegemonic interests. The interventions of the state in the 
water sector – actions that are simultaneously capitalist and socioecological in nature –
interconnect, in a partial and contradictory manner, the individualisation of gains (to 
some social groups and areas) and the attempt to universalise the most basic living 
conditions (to all classes and locations).  
Crucially, in order to capture the complexity of water problems, political ecology 
needs to go beyond the rigid categories vulgarly associated with dialectical reasoning 
(and perhaps inadvertently incorporated into the SRA). Comparable mistakes were made 
by those that tried to extend dialectics to the non-human realm (more famously by Engels 
in the “Dialectics of Nature”) or attempted to identify a truly socionatural dialectics but 
still left nature as a passive object of social agency (e.g. Schmidt, 1971). According to the 
most pedestrian interpretations, dialectics involves a rather simplistic synthesis 
(‘sublation’) of two preceding terms, which are mechanically fused in the resulting 
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outcome. Against the totalising closure of such inflexible binary constructions, Lefebvre 
(1991) argues that dialectical thinking requires the inclusion of the ‘third term’ as a 
rejection of the closed logic of ‘either/or’ and in favour of the radically open formulation 
of ‘both/ and also’. The ‘third term’ contains the first and the second, but in a more 
determinate form, given that it was enriched by the negation of the negation of the first 
term. Lefebvre (1968) believes that the renewed consideration of the third term – not 
simply the resultant of the dialectics of thesis/antithesis and synthesis, but as an 
equivalent and interrelated term with the other two – can become the solution to the 
problems of conflicts and contradictions. If dialectical logic is to transcend formal logic, 
the recognition of a more ‘embellished’ third term allows for a fruitful reunion of 
opposing positions without losing the invigorating force of the opposition. As a result, 
‘thirdering’, or the acceptance of an inclusive trialectical continuum, can represent a 
radical epistemology that produces new alternatives that are both similar and different 
(Soja 1996).  
The removal of the binary interpretations of historical materialism (that 
essentially replicate Engel’s narrow comprehension of Marx’s texts cf. Mann 2009) and 
its replacement with the more creative trinitarian formulation have serious consequences 
for political ecology and its praxis. The real meaning of ‘thirdering’ is to yield a revisited 
ontology that effectively denotes the interdependencies and contradictions of water 
management, which exceeds the simple dualist positions of state-society and nature-
society. The strategic and relational understanding of state action can be, thus, 
reformulated as a ‘trialectical’ relationship between society and nature with the state as 
the emerging ‘third term’. The third term – in the case of the evolution of water 
management, the state (i.e. the ‘political society’ in the Gramscian sense) – is not the 
simple outcome of the interaction of the other two, but corresponds to a contested locus 
of action that reshapes, and simultaneously evolves, with nature and society. As 
mentioned above, in the long history of water management, the state constituted the 
mediator and executor of social demands, according to the balance of power and the 
socioecological conditions. In consequence, we submit that a trialectical version of the 
SRA – at least, for the purpose of political ecology – is a straightforward formulation that 
embraces the dynamic and politicised interaction between society, nature and the state. 
Overall, the trialectical basis of water problems allows for a better representation of the 
convergences and antagonisms between state and society that affects, and is affected, by 
environmental change. 
Although the description of triads is not new in the Marxist argument (for 
example, Marx mentioned the internal contradictions of capitalism as the interplay 
between labour, capital and land, as much as Jessop makes reference to the triplet market-
state-society and Gramsci saw the state as the vertex of a trialectical structure between 
state-economy-civil society), the explicit consideration of the state as the ‘third term’ of 
the interplay between society and nature offers a more creative and inclusive 
understanding of water management issues. Looking from this renewed perspective, 
water problems are grounded on the evolution of the state apparatus (as a semi-
autonomous phenomenon) in relation to class-based struggles (including classes, groups, 
and interpersonal connections) and to the socionatural elements of the water cycle. The 
state is the third term that both reinforces the powers of society over nature and, in an 
attempt to secure social cohesion, regulates the rate of socioecological impacts. In other 
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words, the action of the state, as the third term trialectically interrelated with social 
classes and metabolised nature, not necessarily favours the interests of the stronger social 
groups, but it is the quintessential locus of contradictions, bargaining and contestation. 
Following the trialectical reinterpretation of the SRA proposal, the failures of water 
management can be, thus, translated as the product of the uneven balance of power within 
the intricate relationship between society and nature mediated, and reshaped, by the state. 
Power is not limited to the realm of the state and traditional politics, but permeates the 
channels of interaction between society and historicized nature. Furthermore, trialectics 
should not be seen as an artificial ontological representation of reality aimed to create 
artificial boundaries, but it is the vivid incorporation of highly interconnected categories 
that extend the spheres of action to the more-than-human world (i.e. in the sense that 
nature is not a passive entity that shall be dominated and exploited, but the transformation 
of nature reflects back to society and state). 
Finally, the trialectical basis of water management has also surprising 
implications for the old dilemma between structure and agency: instead of an antagonistic 
opposition between the rigid, top-down structures and autonomous, bottom-up actions, 
structure and agency are both implicated in the trialectical configuration. The relational 
and strategic tension between state, society and nature implies that neither structure is 
pre-given, nor agency always emerges from the same interactions. On the contrary, 
agency is not purely rational and premeditate, but to a large extent it is a heuristic 
construction that seeks to challenge or maintain hegemonies (which are expressed 
through trialectical interdependencies). In other words, it is through trialectical interplays 
that both the structure and agency of water management are constantly reasserted and 
transformed. That is echoed by Karriem (2009) for whom Gramscian political ecology 
provides an insightful explanation of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic positions that 
broaden existing socionatural relations (in this case, the landless movement in Brazil has 
succeeded through strategies and an organisational praxis that are profoundly 
territorialized and continuously evolve to revert repressive governmental interventions). 
Mobilisation and political protest can be, thus, reinterpreted as essentially ‘spatial 
practices’ (Cornwall 2004) and the use of space becomes a critical prerequisite for 
understanding disputes and forms of contestation (Wilson 1999). The next pages will 
show the trialectical formation of water management problems in the Baixada 
Fluminense and how structure and agency are continually repositioned in relation to 
politico-economic disputes.  
 
The persistent water management problems of the Baixada Fluminense 
 
Research background and methodology 
 
This section draws on the preceding argument about the trialectics of water 
management (i.e. the politicised interdependencies between society, nature and the state) 
and applies it to the concrete circumstances of the Baixada Fluminense, a highly 
populated area with a long history of water conflicts and spatial discrimination in the 
periphery of the Rio de Janeiro metropolis. The study is based on a fieldwork conducted 
between April and October 2008 (with preliminary contacts carried out in 2007 and 
follow-up visits in 2009) and involved the participant observation of meetings and public 
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events, reviews of policies documents and archival documentation, and the application of 
44 semi-structured, confidential interviews. Respondents were selected among three main 
groups distributed in three geographical scales: 1) local residents, municipal authorities 
and campaign activists; 2) regulators of the state water agency, managers of the public 
water utility (CEDAE), and politicians; and 3) regulators of the national water agency 
and activists of national NGOs. The frustration of the local stakeholders with the 
persistence of recurrent flooding events, precarious water supply and sanitation services, 
and the serious levels of pollution and environmental degradation were the predominant 
issues considered in discussions and interviews. 
As alluded to already, the research is situated in the interdisciplinary field of 
urban political ecology and followed a critical realist approach. According to critical 
realism, ‘retroduction’ constitutes the main method of inference, which means that events 
are explained by postulating (and identifying) the mechanisms that are capable of 
producing them. The retroduction employed in critical realism is closely associated with 
Hegel’s dialectics of necessity and contingency that, as observed by Žižek (2008), 
considers universal necessity as always retroactive and emerging out of the radical 
contingency of the process. Realist scholars are, thus, expected to examine beyond the 
standard linear historical time and deal with the paradox of “a contingent actual 
emergency which retroactively creates its own possibility, in other words, only when the 
thing takes place can we ‘see’ how it was possible” (Žižek 2008:180). In our case, for 
example, retroduction was used to analyse whether the recent framework of 
environmental governance under implementation in Rio de Janeiro has improved the 
response to water problems or still maintained the institutional distortions that were 
created in the process of regional development. The decision-making process continues to 
operate within the same hierarchical and authoritarian forms of public engagement that 
historically marginalised the majority of the Baixada population. But to understand the 
present, it is necessary to excavate the evolution of projects and programmes, and realise 
that the water problems of the Baixada are the intertwined result of a combination of a 
chaotic urbanisation, careless state interventions and the political appropriation of 
projects and programmes.  
 
Urban growth, regional development and the origins of water problems 
 
The history of water management in the Baixada is directly related to the impacts 
of national politics and economic development on the production of the metropolitan 
space, in the sense that water problems are deeply embedded in the asymmetric relations 
between the Baixada and the centres of power in the city of Rio de Janeiro (the current 
capital of the State of Rio de Janeiro and former capital of Brazil between 1763 and 
1960). In the early days of the Portuguese colonisation, farms were established in the 
Baixada – after the displacement in the 1550s of the tribes of the Tupinambá indigenous 
groups – for the production of sugarcane. The violence over people was followed by 
violence over land and water in the form of deforestation, drainage of swamps and the 
opening of roads. The primitive state and the first generations of migrants acted together 
in the (trialectical) appropriation and transformation of water bodies according to the 
overall colonising enterprise (based on slave labour). In the 18th century, the river system 
was intensively used as a corridor for the transport of gold (and then coffee) from the 
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inland to the Guanabara Bay and then to the port of Rio de Janeiro. The insalubrious 
environment was responsible for low demographic densities, but that started to change in 
the 19th century with public interventions in terms of land reclamation, the construction 
of railway lines and the launch of early sanitation agencies (Fadel 2009). In 1858, the 
first Brazilian railway was inaugurated and established a regular connection between the 
Baixada and the city of Rio de Janeiro. Considering the current condition of water 
scarcity (see below), it is an irony that, for a brief period of time in the 19th century, water 
was abstracted in the Baixada and then transported by train to supply the water demands 
of the mushrooming capital. 
After the abolishment of slavery in 1888, the Baixada was one of the preferential 
sites where ex-slaves could settle their families and find a place to live. Around the turn 
of the 20th century, the economic activity in the capital passed to attract large contingents 
of migrants, particularly from the northern provinces, in search of jobs and opportunities. 
Land reclaimed in the Baixada offered the cheapest alternative to a significant proportion 
of poor migrants that arrived with little more than their own labour power. If the state 
apparatus (from local to national agencies) played a fundamental role in promoting 
economic growth in the southeast of Brazil, it failed to offer basic water services to a 
large proportion of the population, whilst also tacitly tolerated the occupation of riparian 
areas and floodplains. A system of polders and dikes was built in the 1930s to facilitate 
food production, but was later gradually dismantled and engulfed by the chaotic 
urbanisation. A vast and semi-illegal real estate market was created with the parcelling of 
farmland and the formation of low-income neighbourhoods (Monteiro 2005).3 
Immigration peaked in the industrialisation effort of the 1950s and 1960s, during which 
demographic growth reached rates as high as 10% per year. With the construction of the 
modern highway connection between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in 1951 – which 
crosses the Baixada – new areas became available to accommodate the relentless flow of 
incoming migrants. Soon after, with the transference of the federal capital to Brasília, the 
whole Rio de Janeiro area entered into a phase of politico-economic reorganisation, 
which overwhelmed even further the response capacity of the state to cope with a 
booming and unequal process of urbanisation in the Baixada. The bulk of migration 
declined since the 1980s, but the rate of demographic growth remained positive (in the 
1990s, the metropolitan rate was slightly lower than the average in the State of Rio de 
Janeiro, respectively 1.14 and 1.28). According to the 2007 official estimates, the eight 
municipalities that form the Baixada have now a population of 3.2 million inhabitants, a 
large proportion constituted of working class families that depend on jobs available only 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro.4 Figure 1 illustrates the location of the municipalities and 
the main rivers of the Baixada Fluminense (Iguaçu and Sarapuí). 
                                                 
3 The formation of ‘favelas’ (shantytowns) is a phenomenon not normally associated with the Baixada 
Fluminense, but more typically a process of occupation of the hilly areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The 
majority of the Baixada includes low-income houses built by the residents themselves through a long 
period of time and expanded whenever there is some money available to invest in the house. Nonetheless, 
in the last few years there has been an increasing expansion of ‘favelas’ in the Baixada (Monteiro 2005), 
particularly along the river courses. 
4 Considering the national Indicator of Poverty and Inequality (IBGE 2003), the eight municipalities that 
form the Baixada present some of the highest scores (scale between 0-100) in the State of Rio de Janeiro: 
Duque de Caxias (53.53), Mesquita (n/a), Nova Iguaçu (54.15), Belford Roxo (60.06), Nilópolis (32.48), 
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[figure 1 about here] 
 
A perverse combination of disorganized urban growth in a tropical wetland with 
precarious infra-structure resulted in very favourable conditions for the proliferation of 
serious and recurrent water problems. The overall picture is one of a highly populated 
area that suffers from systematic problems of flooding (in the summer) and water deficit 
(in the winter, the dry season), whilst a large extension of the river system is seriously 
affected by organic and industrial pollution (with severe levels of chemical pollution, 
high levels of faecal coliform, low levels of oxygen in the water and contamination of 
sediments by heavy metal cf. ECOLOGUS 2007). According to the statistics of the 
Ministry of Health, 80% of child health problems in the Baixada (children younger than 
five years old) are related to bad water quality. Because of mounting river degradation 
and high population inflow, the Baixada shifted from being a water exporter to Rio de 
Janeiro in the 19th century to a net importer of 90% of its demand in the end of the 20th 
century (most water now comes from the Guandu River, with in its turn depends on the 
transference of water from the Paraíba do Sul River Basin). Even though surveys are not 
reliable in an area where many people live in unofficial neighbourhoods, the national 
sanitation bureau calculates that today around 71% of the population has some form of 
access to public water supply and 28% is served by public sanitation (a significant 
fraction with ‘clandestine’ connections). Only less than 10% of the sewage produced in 
the Baixada has some form of treatment before being discharged on the local 
watercourses or in the Guanabara Bay. Those not officially served by mains water rely on 
a combination of boreholes, water sellers, unauthorised connections to the public network 
and various forms of joint action between neighbours. As we witnessed in many 
locations, it is common that a group of residents divert and distribute treated water among 
them, sharing the construction and operational costs (these are examples of spontaneous 
initiatives that defy the apathy of public authorities). See Figures 2, 3 and 4 for 
illustration of the lived water problems of the Baixada Fluminense. 
 
[figures 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
 
The urban growth and the water problems of the Rio de Janeiro metropolis reflect 
a pattern that is common to all the large cities of Brazil, where social inequalities and the 
fragmentation of the space are closely related to the priorities of market transactions and 
the systematic production of social discrimination (Rolnik 2008). But in the specific case, 
the complexity of water problems in the Baixada is fundamentally the consequence of ill-
conceived development policies and an unresponsiveness or incompetence of public 
agencies, which are all magnified by the dramatic influx of people into a flat tropical 
wetland area with minimal water infra-structure. The trialectical configuration of specific 
water related interactions (i.e. the exogenous commitments of the state, the rising social 
demands and the peculiar hydrological features) led to a difficult experience of recurrent 
floods, unreliable water services and widespread pollution. In the end, the Baixada has 
become a mosaic of regularised neighbourhoods (i.e. properties with approved 
                                                                                                                                                 
São João de Meriti (47.00), Queimados (67.52) and Japeri (76.37, which is the worst result in the State). 
Note that the State average is 32.44.  
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documentation and often connected to water mains) and unofficial settlements (i.e. 
households illegally built in public land, often along the river courses). The tension 
between the poorer residents and public authorities is vividly reflected in the statements 
made in the interviews. After years of an uncontrolled occupation of the riverbanks and 
floodplains, the spatial inequalities have become ingrained in the landscape, posing major 
barriers to the resolution of water problems, as pointed out by a civil servant: 
 
“Well, I have to admit, it is basically impossible for any sector of the government, at the local 
or state level, to control and regulate those areas. These are vast areas, totally taken by years 
of irregular house developments… and the result is that the population is now afraid of the 
river because of the miserable water quality, result of the lack of sanitation and rubbish 
thrown to the water, and flooding” (interview in Jul. 2008).   
 
 Government agencies seem beleaguered with the complexity of social and 
environmental problems and have major difficulty to take into account the dissatisfaction 
of the local residents, who resentfully complain about the discrimination they experience:  
 
“We live in a poor area, which is normally called ‘favela’; discrimination and prejudice 
exist, no doubt. When I go to the City Hall [to complain about water problems] and 
mention that I live here and everybody becomes quickly very suspicious; when I say 
something, I introduce myself, and people move away from me. (…) That is why our 
community centre is so important, to try to understand what the government is trying to do 
with our area, we are affected in some many ways and it is not always easy to know what is 
coming next” (interview in Jul. 2008, location Trio de Ouro, municipality of São João de 
Meriti). 
 
Such confinement of large percentages of the population in marginalised, 
unsuitable zones can be directly related to what Agamben (1998:08) defines as the 
“spatialisation of the political exception”. The is reinforced in another interview with the 
leader of a local cooperative of artisans, who expressed a distinct resentment with the 
wealthier neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro that seem to enjoy much better public 
services: 
 
“The agencies of the government ‘don’t give a damn’ about us here in the Baixada… This 
issue of quality of life is not for us but for those people in the southern part of Rio; all human 
beings should be treated the same way, equal rights, isn’t it…. But you go there and check if 
they have water problems, if they suffer from the lack of basic sanitation…. I am not angry 
with this people that live there, but I would like to see them living here in Campos Elíseos 
[locality in Duque de Caxias] and saying, here is as good as there in Barra da Tijuca [in Rio 
de Janeiro]” (interview in Jul. 2008, in Duque de Caxias). 
 
Moreover, if the state agencies suffer from a chronic lack of means to cope with 
old and new water management problems, the local population is also responsible for 
aggravating that condition (e.g. dumping litter into the rivers, removing the vegetation, 
building houses in the more flood prone areas, etc.). The turbulent relation of sectors of 
the local communities with their immediate circumstances can be largely traced to the 
limited choices available to the majority of the population in terms of where to live. The 
lack of understanding of the some individuals can be also explained by a weak 
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identification with the Baixada (especially by those that arrived more recently), the lack 
of coordination between old and new residents and also the absence of effective 
educational programmes. Several of our interviews detected an uneasiness with the 
behaviour of some neighbours – with numerous examples of construction material, tires 
and even old cars discharged into the rivers – which is an attitude that, in the end, comes 
back to haunt all residents. As pointed out: 
 
“The problem is the relationship of the many members of the community with water, what 
once can see in small, daily attitudes. When you see someone throwing rubbish into the river, 
instead of demanding a proper collection [system from the council], it demonstrates a relation 
that is not of partnership with the river, or maybe only a negative partnership. The same is 
true when some [residents] ask that the small streams are channelized and lined. Many people 
don’t see much reason to collaborate with neighbours, to try to improve the situation. (…) 
Sometimes, there are limited prospects that those more aware of the problems influence the 
others; for those [not aware], the environmental debate is something still very distant. Of 
course, on the top of all that, there are the failures of the government, especially when it 
allows people to live along the floodplains” (interview in Oct. 2008). 
 
The persistent water problems are obviously not a premeditated objective of state 
policies and household expansion, but are the result of something disordered and poorly 
coordinated. Nonetheless, from a strategic relational perspective, it is crucial to recognise 
that out of ‘such chaos’ there are clear winners who have benefited from a historically 
unresolved situation (e.g. demagogic politicians, consultants, construction companies, 
real estate agents, among others). Government initiatives have been historically directed 
towards the locations already served by some form of public infra-structure, primarily 
under the justification that the state couldn’t make investments where the property and 
legal status are uncertain. Even so, there have been numerous cases where water 
infrastructure was provided to private developments without proper regularisation, which 
suggest that the developers were able to exert political influence over local authorities 
and the water utility. In the same way, parts of the Baixada have been incorporated into 
the middle-high income real estate market, as in the case of a residential complex in the 
municipality of Nova Iguaçu (ironically called ‘Acqua’ in an region with serious water 
problems) where flats were being aggressively advertised as a great investment 
opportunity (during our research, flats were sold for more than US$ 100,000, whereas the 
majority of the population earns less than US$ 3,000 per year). Such expensive housing 
developments are evidence of an emerging middle class that benefits from a growing 
service industry (e.g. local shopping centres), a process that magnifies the internal spatial 
and social inequalities within the Baixada (see Figures 5 and 6).  
 
[figures 5 and 6 about here] 
 
Large-scale intervention and the fragile mobilisation of the public 
 
The magnitude and the suffering related to water management problems in the 
Baixada Fluminense are not new and certainly not unknown to politicians and policy-
makers. On the contrary, the local situation has been repeatedly mentioned in plans and 
reports (e.g. FEEMA 1989; Rio de Janeiro 2005) and, more importantly, served as a 
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compelling justification for launching a series of investment programmes (typically 
funded by foreign loans). In the last two decades, more than one billion dollars have been 
invested in water infra-structure and river restoration in the Baixada (cf. Porto 2003), but 
such large sums of money have circulated through the preparation and construction of 
disjointed engineering infra-structure that, by and large, have produced only partial 
results.5 Those apparent failures of government initiatives are more than operational 
incompetence, but constitute a coherent feature of the relation between state and society 
articulated through the management of water. The systematic announcement of new 
projects for the same problems and the same locations – without resolving the structural 
deficiencies and without ever changing the hierarchical, authoritarian relation between 
state agencies and the local communities – serves the double purpose of containing 
popular criticism and creating a permanent source of political profit. The perpetuation of 
a precarious water condition has transformed popular demands into an enduring, and 
profitable, political machinery that operates intermittently both during the electoral 
campaigns (e.g. with the promises of new investments) and between elections (e.g. 
occasional and paternalistic provision of water lorries by politicians in exchange for votes 
in the next election, which are either paid with public money or provided by the water 
utility according to political influence).  
It is necessary to move back in time – employing retroduction (see above) – to 
demonstrate how the trialectics between state, society and water in the Baixada has been 
influenced by the political manipulation of government interventions. Already during the 
main immigration period, in the 1950s and 1970s, populist approaches proved to be very 
effective with a contingent of illiterate, impoverished and disorganised migrants (Barreto 
2006). State interventions were restricted to some isolated investments in water 
infrastructure, a trend that continued during the military dictatorship that controlled the 
country between 1964 and 1985 (Britto 2003). In the 1970s, public works in the Baixada 
represented a significant proportion of the total amount of resources allocated to water 
infrastructure in the State of Rio de Janeiro, but the distribution of funds and the 
operation of water services primarily favoured the wealthier, and politically stronger, 
places (Marques 1996). Given the limited political activity during the dictatorship period 
(e.g. the state governor and many local mayors of the Baixada were directly appointed by 
the central government), the majority of the local population could neither convey their 
demands, nor complain about the lack of water supply and sanitation. The only residual 
activity existed in the realm of the Catholic Church and under the protection of the 
progressive bishops of Duque de Caxias and Nova Iguaçu. The final years of the 
                                                 
5 The investments made by the various levels of government in the Baixada inevitably expanded the 
physical infrastructure and the coverage of water services. However, because of demographic growth and 
operational deficiencies, the average rate of improvement has been little more than 1% per year. Data from 
the Rio de Janeiro statistical office (www.cide.rj.gov.br) show that between 1994 and 2004 the number of 
households officially connected to mains water increased from 323,957 to 354,742 (9.5% of increase) and 
to mains swage improved from 52 to 2,420 (4,554%, but obviously still including only a fraction of the 
total number of households). Individually, in the same period two municipalities reduced the number of 
households served by mains water, namely Belford Roxo (-17.76%) and Queimados (-9.85%). In the year 
2000, the total number of households in the Baixada was 834,460 units. Furthermore, as pointed out by an 
anonymous referee, the international funding agencies are also guilty for the inadequacies of the projects 
implemented in the Baixada Fluminense in recent decades, given that they have influenced the design of 
the interventions and supervised the work of government departments.  
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dictatorship (after 1979) were a phase of intense political revival and reaction to the 
democratic deficit: hundreds of neighbourhood associations and, soon later, the 
respective municipal federations of associations (i.e. MAB in Nova Iguaçu, MUB in 
Duque de Caxias, ABM in São João de Meriti) were created and began to play an 
important role in bringing popular demands to the responsible authorities.  
During the 1980s, the popular mobilisation (primarily expressed through 
territorialized action around neighbourhood associations) was able to exert some 
influence on the direction and rate of investments, particularly of the public water utility 
(CEDAE). However, this period of higher responsiveness of public agencies was very 
short lived: a combination of turbulent transitions from one administration to another and 
lack of genuine managerial commitment resulted in a discontinuity of projects, notorious 
corruption and waste of resources (Britto 2003, Marques 1999, Porto 2003). Since then, 
most of the interventions of governmental agencies responsible for water services and 
environmental protection have been geared towards a series of piecemeal, top-down 
responses. For instance, the first governor elected in the end of the dictatorship (Brizola) 
seized the opportunity to consolidate his leadership in the Baixada and was quick to 
recognise the strength of the newly created neighbourhood associations and of the 
Political Committee of Sanitation of the Baixada Fluminense (a grassroots organisation 
dedicated to debate water and sanitation issues). By offering paid jobs in the government 
to the most prominent leaders, those organisations were soon under the control of the 
state government and had their autonomy gradually undermined (Porto 2003).  
In 1984, the Global [Comprehensive] Sanitation Plan (PEB) was launched by 
Governor Brizola with ambitious targets and an innovative focus on condominial 
sanitation schemes (i.e. a low-cost technology through which pipelines are laid under 
paths and across properties, rather than under roads, using local labour). However, 
clashes between state and federal administrations destabilised the implementation of the 
PEB and, out of 576 km of pipelines initially planned, only 70 km were effectively 
installed. The next administration (Governor Franco) redirected the PEB project to the 
more conventional technological design and reduced the overall target to 251 km (which 
was also not achieved). The problems of bad services, limited involvement of the 
population and a problematic integration between state and municipal administrations 
nonetheless persisted. The water utility (CEDAE) continued to prioritise investments in 
the wealthier locations within the metropolitan area, which obviously reduced the 
chances of the Baixada. A new initiative (called Sector Water Supply Plan) was launched 
by Governor Franco and aimed, but failed, to install 89 km of pipelines. In addition, in 
1988 Franco introduced another project, Reconstruction Rio, in response to the outcry 
over the floods that castigated the Baixada two years earlier, with a budget of U$ 288 
millions (mostly funded by the World Bank) for sanitation, urban drainage and solid 
waste. But only around half of that amount was effectively spent due to bureaucratic 
delays and, more important, the end of the governor’s term of office. Brizola returned as 
governor in 1990, but his second mandate was again marred by a tumultuous relation 
with the federal government.  
Despite the repeated problems that characterised the various projects formulated 
in the 1980s and 1990s (note that only a subset is mentioned here), a much larger 
initiative was launched in 1994, the Guanabara Pollution Control Programme (PDBG) 
with a total budget of US$ 860.5 millions (funded by the IADB and JBIC). The focus of 
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the new Programme was the whole territory that drains to the Guanabara Bay and, 
specifically for the Baixada, PDBG included major infrastructure works, such as seven 
new storage reservoirs (to serve a population of 575,000), two sewage treatment works 
(to serve an equivalent population), drainage, planning, environmental restoration and 
educational projects (Rio de Janeiro 1994). Unfortunately, five gubernatorial mandates 
later (respectively, Governors Brizola, Alencar, Garotinho, Rosinha and Cabral), PDBG 
is still not concluded, having been affected by constant delays, lack of dialogue with civil 
society, failure to engage the local authorities, and ill-conceived projects that are not 
easily connected to the existing water infrastructure (Britto 2003). Projects have been 
fraught with serious evidences of corruption, waste of resources and the overlapping of 
targets (Vargas 2001:145). In addition, local authorities systematically failed to apportion 
resources to complement investments made by the state administration (Britto 1998). 
The distortions related to the sequence of investment programmes were 
aggravated by the insensitivity of the water utility to the demands of the impoverished 
communities of the Baixada. CEDAE is well known for its insensitivity to social 
criticism and permeability to the interests of private construction companies (Marques 
1999) and, more recently, its involvement in the stock market (i.e. preparation to sell 
shares to private investors in the stock market cf. CEDAE 2008). Based on our interviews 
with residents, it is clear that the dialogue between the water utility and its customers has 
been very contentious. For instance, in 2006, the company suddenly started a harsh cost 
recovery campaign (to reduce the rate of unaccounted for water), which included 
draconian measures, such as cancelling water supply and entering family houses illegally 
and without prior permission. Because of an alleged arbitrariness in the cancellation of 
services, residents in some areas started to protest and organise themselves in 
commissions (such as in the Araruama Park in the municipality of São João do Meriti). 
Moreover, these are only provisional commissions with a limited mandate and small 
membership. Some residents have also appealed to the public solicitor [defensor público], 
who in an interview expressed his own frustration with the unwillingness of the company 
to negotiate old debts on more reasonable terms. Similarly, in 2007, a councillor of 
Duque de Caxias escorted a protest group to the headquarters of the company in Rio de 
Janeiro to complain about the lack of water, but the group heard that nothing could be 
done due to the lack of resources and, more importantly, the fact that the residents did not 
formally own the land where their houses were built. In the end, the group received the 
gloomy recommendation from CEDAE: “pray to rain, that is the best you can do…” 
(interview with a local resident, Jul. 2008).6  
Overall, the more productive dialogue between the government and the 
neighbourhood associations that was established in the first moment of redemocratisation 
rapidly declined and was replaced by circumstantial and ephemeral forms of 
communication. Particularly in the case of internationally funded projects, the lending 
agencies demanded the formation of ad hoc committees and commissions, but with only a 
                                                 
6 Because of the recurring unresponsiveness of the state water utility and the influence of national policies 
in favour of privatisation, various municipal administrations in the Baixada have considered the 
cancellation of the contract with CEDAE and the concession of services to private operators. The 
privatisation of municipal services has been strongly, and till now, successfully opposed by the local 
population, sometimes at the cost of physical confrontation, as happened in the town of Belford Roxo in 
2002 when the mayor tried to bypass the local council and nearly transferred the water service to an 
international operator (cf. various interviews, 2008). 
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narrow remit and questionable legitimacy (Macedo et al. 2007). With the weakening of 
the neighbourhood associations, there has been a growing prominence of local NGOs and 
similar campaign groups in the Baixada. Different than the class-based associations, 
which focused their action primarily on social justice, most environmental NGOs sponsor 
a more ‘pragmatic’ strategy centred on claims for eco-efficiency and better 
environmental regulation. Environmentalists seem more inclined to consider their 
initiatives as part of a global movement, while community leaders are more concerned 
with the local context. The typical NGO activist in the Baixada is someone with a 
university degree, low middle class professional with strong views about the 
environment, but not necessarily a clear political affiliation (according to various 
interviews in 2008). NGO activists are often willing to accept or tolerate the political 
disputes and the electoral mechanisms that maintain politicians in their seats, as long as 
they demonstrate some form of commitment to environmental matters. In addition, in 
many cases the NGOs rely on public funds or some form of governmental support 
(through various grant schemes nowadays available in Brazil), which means a more 
pervasive relation between environmental NGOs and the state. That often creates some 
level of suspicion, as observed by a local community leader in an interview:  
 
“The NGOs, because of their interests, fail to understand the water problem as a whole, 
including geography, legislation, etc. But in public, it seems that the members of the NGOs 
know everything and we, from the community, are totally ignorant” (interview in Jul. 2008). 
 
The latest attempts 
 
The predominant experience of water management in the Baixada since the 1980s 
can be summarised as the constant announcement of new initiatives and, even before a 
single drop of water is supplied or metre of riverbank is recovered, the organisation by 
politicians of large events to celebrate the new programme (those typically coincide with 
the beginning of an electoral campaign, as happened in 2008 during our fieldwork). It is 
normally the case the last interventions ignore any lessons learned in earlier projects, but 
follow only a short, bureaucratised appraisal of previous experiences. As mentioned 
above, the consolidation of a ‘democratic’ regime in the country in the last decades 
paradoxically coincided with the progressive demobilisation of the grassroots movement 
that emerged in the end of the dictatorship and gradually transformed the treatment of 
popular demands into a vote-seeking machine in the Baixada.7 A long ethnographic study 
conducted by Barreto (2006) demonstrates the ambiguities of the contemporary political 
disputes in the Baixada, which unfold through a capricious mixture of neglect and 
populism. That was essentially the result of the weak forms of grassroots mobilisation 
with the persistent attempt to domesticate spontaneous leaders and isolate the more 
critical voices.  
It must be acknowledged that water management and environmental restoration in 
crowded areas are notoriously expensive, however that is not enough to explain the 
persistence of precarious water services, insalubrity and flooding. Water problems in the 
                                                 
7 In our interviews after the 2008 municipal election, we heard about serious evidences of electoral 
corruption (apparently, votes were being bought at US$ 20 to 35). 
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Baixada are first and foremost a vivid outcome of political disputes ingrained in social 
and spatial inequalities. As acknowledged in an interview with a municipal authority:  
 
“The active involvement of the local actors has historically been very low, too low; we 
should recognise that past interventions didn’t produce much change, but only reproduced a 
clientistic logic. The initiatives were formulated elsewhere, they entered into the territory 
and eventually left without democratising urban policies and creating different relations 
between society and the state” (interview in Jul. 2008, member of the municipal 
administration of Nova Iguaçu). 
 
The shortcomings of infra-structure and river engineering projects in the Baixada 
mirror the more recent introduction of the new water legislation in the State of Rio de 
Janeiro since 1999 (Law 3239), which conforms to the 1997 federal law (an acclaimed 
milestone of the history of the water governance reforms in Brazil).8 Formally, the river 
basin committees are now the democratic forums where the representatives of civil 
society organisations, water users and the government are expected to deliberate about 
the strategic management of water resources. However, the Baixada was prevented from 
having its own river basin committee due to an authoritarian decision of Governor 
Rosinha in 2005 (Decree 38,260) that incorporated it into the activities of the broader 
Guanabara Bay Committee. The imposed committee ended up covering all river basins 
that drain to the Guanabara Bay and two independent lacustrian systems. The formation 
of such large assembly went against the fragile mobilisation that started to emerge in the 
west and east sections of the Bay in the early 2000s. It represented a dilution of the 
stakeholder representation and reduced the focus away from the social deprivation and 
political discrimination that predominantly characterise the water management problems 
of the Baixada. In addition, even before the Guanabara Bay Committee was established, 
the government commissioned a master water plan to technical consultants with 
practically no contact with the local population (published in Rio de Janeiro 2005). 
Although the new regulatory context encourages the formation of 
‘multistakeholder approaches’ that are supposed to involve all the social actors, 
government agencies have maintained a privileged position within the Guanabara Bay 
Committee, whist the weaker groups (above all, those that represent the marginalised 
areas, such as the Baixada) have had major difficulties to be treated as equal partners. 
The paternalistic forms of engaging the local residents correspond to the observation of 
Mosse (2001) that participation can be operationally constrained by formal and informal 
bureaucratic goals and, particularly, when it is oriented towards concerns that are external 
to the local reality. Furthermore, the entire committee has bee systematically sidelined by 
the state administration vis-à-vis the centralised approval of economic development plans 
that have a significant impact on the aquatic systems of the Metropolitan Area. The most 
important demonstration was the decision to build a petrochemical complex to the east of 
the Baixada (called Comperj), which is likely to aggravate water scarcity in an area 
                                                 
8 The 1997 legislation (Law 9433) created the National Water Resources Management System (SINGREH) 
as an administrative structure that extends from the federal government to state authorities and river basin 
committees. The legislation introduced new regulatory instruments, such as plans, river classification, 
licences, and bulk water charges, which are classical tenets of the governance cannon. Despite the national 
configuration, most of the resources and the decision-making power remain with the National Water 
Agency (see Ioris 2007). 
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already suffering from chronic water deficits.  Five possible sources of freshwater to 
Comperj were under consideration at the time of our fieldwork, but the Guanabara Bay 
Committee (despite its legal mandate) was never involved in the decision-making process 
and had been only marginally informed about technical details. Comperj is also going to 
exacerbate the impacts on the estuarine area of Guapi-Mirim, one of the best preserved 
biological reserves in whole metropolitan area.  
Together with Comperj, a new round of investments in terms of water infra-
structure and river restoration was announced in 2007 (as part of the national Programme 
to Accelerate Growth - PAC) with US$ 370 million for urban drainage (funds transferred 
to the municipal authorities), US$ 100 million for water supply and sanitation (under the 
responsibility of CEDAE) and US$ 135 million to restore watercourses in the Iguaçu 
River Basin (under the responsibility of the state water regulator, SERLA; the Iguaçu 
River Basin has an area of 762 km², which corresponds to 53% of the Baixada 
Fluminense, and it is where most problems occur). Based on our assessments, however, 
there are at least two fundamental problems with PAC, one political and another 
operational. The first problem is the decisive influence of party politics on the selection 
of projects and prioritisation of intervention areas, which evidently indicates a private 
appropriation of state action. Among the eight municipalities of the Baixada, Nova 
Iguaçu received substantially more resources for water supply and sanitation than the 
other seven, even with comparable levels of water problems (according to SNIS data, 
available at www.snis.gov.br). To some extent, that was due to a better structure of 
municipal planning (e.g. recent municipal plans were published in 1992, 1997 and 2001), 
which helped the PAC to identify areas of intervention in 52 neighbourhoods of Nova 
Iguaçu. Even so, the decisive reason seems to be the political proximity between Mayor 
Lindberg Farias, Governor Cabral and President Lula. Farias is a young politician that, 
before being appointed candidate in 2004, moved from the far-left to a pragmatic centre-
right position.9 Water issues represented an important part of his political manifesto and 
during the campaign Farias declared that president Lula had promised a “massive 
investments in asphalt and basic sanitation” in Nova Iguaçu (quoted in Barreto 2006). All 
the evidence indicate that it was not a coincidence that in 2008, the year of Lindberg’s re-
election, Nova Iguaçu had become the third largest receiver of PAC investments in the 
whole country.  
The second main problem is the remaining authoritarianism in the preparation and 
implementation of PAC projects, despite the official discourse of participation and 
decentralisation. Our research followed closely and for several months the restoration 
project, attending public events and interviewing the various sectors involved. It was 
possible to notice a systematic attempt of public agencies to present the project as an 
advanced and improved response to the recurrent problems of flooding and river 
degradation. From the outset, it was evident that the project included an element of 
‘millenarianism’, as demonstrated by Governor Cabral at its inauguration on 01/07/2008, 
when he declared that the project will be able to ‘save [sic] the people that live along the 
river and suffer from flooding’ and will benefit 2.5 million people (a gross exaggeration, 
since only part of the Iguaçu river basin will be the object of the project). Curiously, 
                                                 
9 Farias is a high-flier politician with no previous links with the city of Nova Iguaçu, but who was selected 
by his party (PT) as someone with a serious potential to run for governor in the near future (likely to 
happen in 2010, especially if Cabral is appointed as vice-presidential candidate). 
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despite the extensive intervention in the river system, an ‘administrative’ decision 
dispensed with the legal requirement of a prior environmental impact assessment and 
only a simplified report was produced to allow the project to be licensed by the 
environmental regulator. The most controversial aspect of the project, nonetheless, was 
the requirement to remove more than 2,300 low-income families (around 10,000 persons) 
in order to make space for the machinery that was needed to dredge the river courses. Our 
fieldwork coincided exactly with the household surveillance of those impacted by the 
river restoration, which provided a unique opportunity to compare current practices with 
the shortcomings identified in past water management projects. For example, the survey 
of those affected by the river restoration project was conducted by social workers hired 
by local NGOs, which in its turn were contracted by construction companies that provide 
service to the government. 
The fundamental mistake of the relocation process, amplified by the inflexible 
dialogue with local communities, was the undifferentiated treatment of the various groups 
of residents. Those dwellers that are relatively better-off expressed their discontent with 
the fact that the investments made in their houses or the backyard space would be lost 
when they move to flats still to be constructed. Those relatively worse-off (mainly 
unemployed people leaving on social benefits) complained that they would be forced to 
pay for the new residences and also pay household bills (electricity, water, and council 
tax) they could currently manage to avoid. Moreover, in the several meetings in 2008, 
civil servants and consultants repeatedly presented a handful of standard PowerPoint 
slides with an overview of the project, but provided no specific answers about the 
operational details that really mattered to the affected population. Most of our interviews 
with residents in the days immediately after the meetings demonstrated a growing 
uneasiness about the project and a high level of residual uncertainty. The public did not 
just oppose the river restoration project in the light of bad previous experiences (which 
are vividly present in their memories), but the initiative seemed to multiply the vices of 
the previous approaches under a superficial discourse of public participation and 
sustainable water management that was borrowed from the theory of water governance 
(as demonstrated in ECOLOGUS 2007). On the whole, the alleged improvements of the 
ongoing initiatives (under the search for better governance) are in fact restricted to 
superficial changes in rhetoric without revising the discriminatory forms of addressing 
the complexity of local water problems. 
 
Water Problems at the Trialectics between State, Society and Nature 
 
The experience of the Baixada Fluminense represents an emblematic example of 
the complex evolution of water management problems and how these are deeply 
incorporated into the reproduction of social and political inequalities. The urban 
development of the Baixada, in the sphere of influence of Rio de Janeiro, is not atypical 
of other Latin American conurbations. Nonetheless, the severe reality of recurrent water 
problems (e.g. pollution, flooding and water scarcity) provides a vivid illustration of the 
asymmetries of power behind relations between the state and competing social groups. 
Power has been exercised over water in the Baixada both through selective public 
policies (i.e. that benefit the stronger and more endowed players) and through the 
interstices of state action (i.e. the structural limitation of the state apparatus to deal with 
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an area with fast population influx and unplanned land use). The same state, which 
represents primarily the interests of the conservative elite outside the Baixada, is also 
guilty for stimulating a particular form of regional development based on low salaries, 
fiscal incentives and abundant workforce. In that sense, the management of natural 
resources in the Baixada is an integral element of the public policies and class-based 
struggles mediated by the capitalist state in charge of the industrialisation and the 
economic development, with piecemeal concessions to popular demands. 
The intricate and multiscale interventions of the state can only be properly 
analysed by making use of a dynamic theoretical framework, such as the strategic-
relational approach, particularly in its more recent version that incorporates territory, 
place, scale and networks (Jessop et al. 2008). However, the example of the Baixada 
Fluminense demonstrates the need for an explanatory tool that more comprehensively 
articulates the tensions between social dynamics, state authority and environmental 
change. It was claimed above that the philosophical basis of trialectical thinking – in the 
context of historical materialism and the social production of space – helps to understand 
the origin of problems, the persistence of contradictions and the search for solutions. In 
the particular case of water management, the trialectics between state, society and nature 
provides the ontological grounds to explain nuanced occurrences and broader tendencies. 
Through the evolving trialectical relations between state, society and nature we can 
perceive how the recent calls for environmental governance and public participation have 
been contained by the long legacy of authoritarianism and social exclusion, which has 
historically characterised the allocation and use of water in the Baixada. It is in the action 
of the state, as the third term of the trialectics – both a mediator of clashes and an 
executer of the hegemonic demands – that the contradiction and the intricacies of water 
management become more evident. Local water problems remain part of a potentially 
explosive, but in practice subservient, combination of poverty, precarious urbanisation, 
generalised violence and opportunistic politics. If daily water problems don’t seem to 
attack proper attention from public authorities or mangers of public utilities, it serves as a 
compelling justification for regular investment plans and regional development 
programmes. Those erratic projects are in effect the only moment when the water 
problems of the Baixada receive specific consideration by state agencies and occupy 
some space in the media. Such initiatives, however, are never debated upfront with local 
communities, but are only based on an expert interpretation of water problems and, more 
importantly, on a politicised prioritisation of targets. 
The combination of government unresponsiveness and internal disagreements 
have led a number of local residents more predisposed to resort to populist leaders rather 
than taking part in endless meetings and marches to complain about their water problems. 
During our research, it was possible to identify several politicians ready to send water 
tankers (naturally, in exchange for votes later in the coming election) and willing to make 
demagogic speeches on water pollution or on the misery of flooding. A related problem is 
the internal division between community members and the (partial) discredit of 
traditional grassroots associations. Even so, it is not because established forms of political 
mobilisation fail to represent all the people that social groups will be necessarily 
prevented from searching for alternative forms of reaction. On the contrary, the untold 
water history of the Baixada is the long saga of survival and popular creativity developed 
to overcome a range of difficulties and obstacles (i.e. what indicates that an unfavourable 
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sociopolitical structure has not avoided the materialisation of critical agency). Despite the 
fact that the performance of government agencies is still fraught with political and 
operational biases, the more organised communities of the Baixada continue to 
spontaneously raise their voice against injustices whenever they can seize the 
opportunity. Many grassroots organisations have understood that the construction of 
more effective basis of water management can only emerge from the reversal of the deep 
inequalities established and maintained through a broad historico-geographical 
configuration, which keeps treating the Baixada as the political backyard of the 
‘paradisiacal’ places found only in the southern part of the city of Rio de Janeiro.  
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